Tolerance

[To argue that Tolerance is a moral virtue, in accordance with the theoretical framework for judging virtue that Aristotle sets forth in the Nicomachean Ethics]

When we speak of virtue, we are concerned with right actions giving rise to good states.  Activities in accordance with virtue are characteristic of virtue, so it is through a person’s actions that he is considered virtuous.  So, the good person, with respect to his own natural inclinations in his characteristic activities, is the one who acts in accordance with virtue.  Virtue is not determined by nature, but by the character one gives to his own activities throughout his life.  Thus, the moral virtues are in everyone’s power to acquire.  Achieving this requires the right feelings and actions in all circumstances where pleasures and pains are involved.  Society dictates, to an extent, the appropriate feelings and actions.  And as it is clear that society evolves over time, it is reasonable to conceive of feelings and actions Aristotle had not considered.  Legislators are constantly revising laws or drafting new ones to account for societal changes.  The formation of federal institutions, the development of corporations, introduction of organized religions, and advancements in technology all elicit new concerns.  And as the feelings and actions considered in writing laws determining honors and punishments are the same feelings and actions that define virtue, Aristotle would agree that his list of moral virtues might not include certain virtues that the modern moral agent would require.  One that I find necessary is the virtue of tolerance.

Tolerance is concerned with conviction.  Our characters are defined by certain settled beliefs, or convictions, about what we consider to be the best for society and what is best for individuals.  But the character of one person is sure to be different from the character of another, as no two people can be identical in education, upbringing, and inclinations.  So it follows that each person experiences different degrees of conviction to different things and at different times.  These feelings are telling of virtue, and the best is found where the feeling of conviction is had at the right time, concerning the right things, towards the right people, for the right end, and in the right way.  Here, where virtue lies, is the mean state between excess and deficiency.  Tolerance can be found in such a state, where one feels only the right amount of conviction and where resulting actions always accord to this amount.

The states of excess and deficiency are considered vices.  With regard to conviction, the one who feels an extreme excess of it and acts so perversely is intolerant.  The one who feels the extreme deficiency of conviction, where one lacks any convictions at all, if such a state is even possible, is characterless.

We can define tolerance as the open spirit towards the views and action of others.  So when the feeling of conviction is so great that the acceptance of the views and actions of others painful, one is in a vicious state of excess and clearly intolerant.  In the opposite vicious state, where one is characterless, one’s actions are comparable to those of a pebble on a busy street, absent of any convictions and as easily influenced one way as the other.

Tolerance is virtue of character rather than a virtue of the intellect because it is concerned with both pleasures and pains, thought apparently more concerning pains as illustrated above.  As one feels convictions, some strong some not yet settled, it is painful to act against those convictions in considering others, and it is pleasurable, or at least gratifying, to persist and project those convictions.  I am convinced that in order to be a good person, that is a virtuous moral agent, in the modern day, it is necessary to be tolerant.  However, I am not so excessively convicted to this belief as to reject any argument to the contrary.

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